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AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONDITIONAL COOPERATION 
 







  Experimental and empirical evidence identifies the existence of social 
preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences.  In this paper, we 
further examine one such social preference:  conditional cooperation.  We run three 
experimental public goods games, the traditional voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM, also called the linear public goods game), the weak-link mechanism (WLM) and 
the best-shot mechanism (BSM).  We then analyze the existence and types of 
conditional cooperation observed.  We find that participants are responsive to the past 
contributions of others in all three games, but are most responsive to different 
contributions in each game: the median in the VCM, the minimum in the WLM and the 
maximum in the BSM.  We conclude by discussing implications of these differences for 
behavior in these three mechanisms.  This paper thus refines our notions of conditional 
cooperation to allow for different types of public good production functions and by 
extension, other contexts. 
 
Keywords: experimental economics, conditional cooperation, public goods, voluntary 
contribution mechanism, weakest link mechanism, best-shot mechanism. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
A recent spate of theories has emerged to formalize pro-social preferences as observed 
in experiments and in real life (see Sobel, 2005 for an outstanding review).  This paper 
focuses on one category of these preferences—conditional cooperation, also called reciprocal 
or matching preferences (e.g. Sugden 1984).  Here, individuals prefer to cooperate with or 
help those who have helped them in the past, but not those who have acted selfishly.   
These conditional preferences have been observed in many lab experiments, as well as 
in the field. In the lab, Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) and Camerer and Fehr (2006) review 
evidence on conditional cooperation and reciprocal behavior and discuss their impact on core 
issues in economics. Individual papers identifying conditional cooperation in linear public 
goods games include Croson (1998), Keser and van Winden (2000), Brandts and Schram 
(2001), Fishbacher et al (2001), and van Dijk et al. (2002).  More recently, Andreoni and 
Petrie (2004), Croson et al. (2005), and Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) provide both 
evidence in favor of conditional cooperation and some nice examples of the importance of a 
deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying these motivations.  
Many field experiments also show the existence and impact of conditionally 
cooperative behavior in natural settings. Falk (2004) and Frey and Meier (2004a and 2004b) 
use large-scale field experiments involving the decisions of thousand of individuals (from 
10.000 to 33.000).  These papers find strong evidence in favor of reciprocal or conditionally 
cooperative behavior. List (2004) and Shang and Croson (2006) show the impact of 
conditional cooperation in smaller-scale field experiments on the voluntary provision of 
public goods. 
In this paper we present experimental results from three public goods environments 
testing the existence and forms of conditionally cooperative preferences.  We begin with the 
well-known voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM, also known as the linear public goods 
game), where conditionally cooperative preferences have primarily been explored.  Next we 
move to two relatively under-studied games, the weakest link mechanism (WLM) and the 
simultaneous best-shot mechanism (BSM).  Behavior in these games is of interest in and of 
themselves, in that the games are often used to model public goods provision, as well as team 
production in firms and other social dilemma-type problems. Further, we are the first to 
identify the existence of conditional cooperation preferences in the WLM and the BSM.  But 
the main contribution of our paper lies in the comparison between the forms of conditional 
cooperation in these three contexts.  In particular we ask: to what previous action do 
individuals most strongly respond in these games?   2
These games differ in fundamental ways, both economically and psychologically. In 
the VCM, the amount of public good produced depends on the total or average of individual 
contributions.  Thus one might imagine that the average or median contribution of others is 
psychologically most salient in determining one’s own contribution.  In the WLM, the amount 
of public good produced depends on the minimum of all contributions. Thus one might 
imagine that the minimum contribution of others is psychologically most salient in 
determining one’s own contribution. In the BSM, the amount of public good produced 
depends on the maximum individual contribution.  Thus one might imagine that the maximum 
contribution of others is psychologically most salient in determining one’s own contribution.  
In this paper we examine the decision-making processes in all three institutions. First, 
we will describe behavior in each game, finding deviations from equilibrium predictions in all 
treatments along with some convergence to equilibria over time. Second, we will examine the 
impact of counterparts’ previous contributions on one’s own contribution in each treatment.  
We find, as predicted, that the most salient focus in the VCM is the median contribution of 
others, in the WLM is the minimum contribution of others and in the BSM is the maximum 
contribution of others.  Finally, we present an analysis that compares between games, and 
shows that individuals respond more to the median in the VCM than the other two games, 
more to the minimum in the WLM than the other two games, and more to the maximum in the 
BSM than the other two games.
1 We conclude with a discussion of the importance of 
understanding not just the existence of conditional cooperation, but its specific form in 
making predictions and explaining economic behavior. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the games, previous 
research that has been conducted in each, and their experimental implementation. Section 3 
reports the experimental results and Section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1Croson et al.  (2005) present some early results on conditional cooperation using a subset this data as well.  In 
that paper, we examine only the VCM and the WLM games.  In addition, we show only that in the VCM 
contributions react to the median contribution of others (with no comparisons to the minimum or maximum) and 
in the WLM contributions reach to the minimum contribution of others (with no comparisons to the median or 
maximum).  In addition, this paper provides a comparison between the VCM, WLM and BSM which has not 
been previously documented.    3
II.   THE EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
II.1.   The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) 
In economic experiments, the most common public goods institution is the VCM (see 
Ledyard, 1995 or Keser, 2002 for a review). In this mechanism, the amount of public good 
produced is determined by the total (or average) contribution of others in the group, as 
described below.  The game has a unique equilibrium of full free-riding (dominant strategy in 
the one-shot game, unique Nash in the finitely repeated game).  Previous research has 
documented that individuals contribute significantly more than the predicted level of zero, 
although there is much speculation about exactly why.  Previous research has identified 
conditional cooperation in this area. 
Our experimental environment mirrors those of previous experiments.  N=4 subjects 
are endowed with ei=50 Cents and are asked to simultaneously and privately allocate this 
endowment between a public and a private account. The payoff of each individual i is 
determined by the sum of his allocation to the private account and twice of the group´s 
average allocation to the public account.
2  If e = average (e1, e2, e3, e4), i´s payoff is given in 
equation (1). 
  e ei i 2 ) 50 ( + − = π         ( 1 )  
 
II.2.   The weakest link mechanism (WLM) 
The WLM was introduced by Hirschelifer (1983).  In this mechanism, the amount of 
public good produced is determined not by the average (or total) contribution as in the VCM, 
but by the minimum contribution of the group.  This mechanism has been used to capture 
features of joint production (van Huyck et al. 1990, Reichman and Weimann 2004), meeting 
start-times and submitting chapters for books (Weber, Camerer and Knez 2004), or 
coordination failure in organizations (Brandts and Cooper 2006) .  
A few experimental studies have been published using the WLM. Van Huyck, Battalio 
and Beil (1990) designed similar (minimum effort) coordination games with seven symmetric 
Pareto-ranked equilibria that were played by large groups repeatedly in the laboratory. They 
                                                 
2Note that the notation of the team production function in equation (1) is non-standard; usually the return from 
the team production is formally presented by the sum of contributions and a marginal per capita return of ½ = 
2/N, where N=4 is the number of team members.  We choose this presentation to highlight the parallelism 
between this game and the other games.   4
conclude that the selection of the payoff-dominant equilibrium is extremely unlikely as all 
their experiments converge quickly to the most inefficient equilibrium.  
Other authors have searched for strategies to improve coordination on pareto-superior 
equilibria.  Strategies explored include reducing the number of players (Van Huyck et al. 
1990), adding money back guarantees and thus decreasing the costs of contributing (Fatas et 
al. 2006), adding entry fees in order to play the game (Cachon and Camerer 1996), using 
sequential rather than simultaneous play (Weber et al. 2004), increasing the number of 
repetitions (Berninghaus and Erhard 1998), adding pre-play communication (Riechmann and 
Weimann 2004, Broseta et al. 2003), adding between group competition (Bornstein et al. 2002 
and Riechmann and Weimann 2004) and excluding low-contributing players (Croson et al. 
2006).  However, as far as we know, none of the previous studies has focused on the role of 
conditional cooperation in this setting; that is, to which information do individuals react 
making their own decisions? 
Our experimental parameters for the WLM were chosen to make it as similar to the 
classical VCM as possible. Four team members simultaneously and privately make decisions 
of how much ei=50 Cents to allocate to the private and public account. Public good is 
produced according to a Leontief production technology from this account; thus the minimum 
contribution determines the output, all contributions in excess of the minimum are lost. If e = 
min {e1, e2, e3, e4} is the smallest order statistic of contribution, i’s payoff is given in equation 
(2). 
  e ei i 2 ) 50 ( + − = π         ( 2 )  
Each symmetric strategy profile, i.e., each allocation in which every subject 
contributes the same amount constitutes a Nash equilibrium. The payoffs in these equilibria 
are the same to all subjects and increase linearly in the minimum effort, π i = 50 + e. Hence, 
the equilibria are Pareto-ranked, with the payoff-dominant equilibrium being maximum 
contribution but the risk-dominant equilibrium being zero contribution. 
 
II.3.  The best shot mechanism (BSM) 
The best shot mechanism was also introduced and analyzed by Hirshleifer (1983). 
Here the amount of public good provided depends on the maximum contribution of the group.  
This game has been used to analyze production technologies like R&D or other discoveries,   5
where groups may be working simultaneously, but only the contributions of the one that 
“wins” create value. 
  The equilibria of this game are complicated.  In particular, there are N 
asymmetric but efficient equilibria of the stage game, where N is the number of players in the 
game (for us, N=4).  In each of these equilibria, one player fully contributes to the public 
good, while the other players fully free-ride, contributing nothing.  The problem then 
becomes, which equilibria will be coordinated on by the group, especially since the 
equilibrium payoffs are unequal: the free-riding players earn significantly more than the full-
contributor.  Thus this game yields an impure coordination problem, sometimes called the 
“volunteers dilemma,” where one player must volunteer to be the full contributor.  In the 
finitely repeated game, of course, any sequence of these stage-game equilibria is itself an 
equilibrium.
3  
The best shot mechanism has been experimentally explored in an easier-to-solve 
sequential version with two players by Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989), Prasnikar and Roth 
(1992), Duffy and Feltovich (1999), Andreoni et al. (2002), and Carpenter (2002). Here, 
however, we run a simultaneous version of the game where four participants decide how 
much of their endowment to allocate to the public account at the same time as other subjects 
in their group are making the same decision. If e = max {e1, e2, e3, e4}, then individual i’s 
payoff is. 
  e ei i 2 ) 50 ( + − = π         ( 3 )  
Of primary interest, however, is not simply behavior in these games, although we will 
report behavior and its relationship with equilibrium predictions briefly.  Instead, we are 
interested in the existence and form of conditional cooperation.  We expect that players in 
these games will react to the previous actions of their counterparts.  But we expect that which 
action is salient will depend on the game.  In particular, we predict that players will react to 
the average (mean or median) contributions of others in the VCM, the minimum contribution 
of others in the WLM and the maximum contribution of others in the BSM. 
 
                                                 
3Additionally, there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each subject contributes their endowment to 
team production with a probability of (1-p
N-1), where p=½ for our parameters (see Croson et al. 2006). Several 
other (less efficient) mixed strategy equilibria exist as well.   6
II.4.   The experimental procedure 
In this paper we report the results of computerized experiments, which closely 
replicate environment, information and payoff structures of previous literature.
4 The 
experiments involved 24 economics undergraduates in each of the first two treatments (VCM 
and WLM) and 48 in the third one (the BSM). We use a between-subject design, thus each 
subject participates in only one treatment.  Subjects were randomly allocated into groups of 
four as they arrived into the lab.  None of the subjects had previously participated in a public 
goods experiment.   
The experiments entailed a ten period finitely repeated game.  We used a partners 
procedure, so participants´ randomly-formed groups of four remained together throughout the 
game. Instructions were written in neutral language, referring to allocations of cents rather 
than contributions.  Before the experiment, participants completed a quiz to ensure that they 
understood the payoffs involved in the experiment, and there was an informal post-
experimental survey to elicit participants’ thoughts about the experience.  Instructions, 
quizzes and surveys, and a summary of their results, are available from the authors. 
After each round of the game, participants were told the individual contributions of the 
other three members of their group in increasing order of contribution; individual 
contributions were not identified with their contributor such that it was impossible to trace 
individual contributions (as in Croson 2000). Additionally, subjects were informed about their 
own earnings both in total and subdivided by private and public accounts.  Average earnings 
of a subject were €10.43 in the WLM experiments, €13.06 in the VCM and €16.22 in the 
BSM. Experiments took less than an hour to run. 
 
III.   EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Figure 1 shows the average contributions to the public good in each of the three 
environments over the 10 rounds.  
                                                 
4Urs Fischbacher’s z-tree was used for the computer programme.   7
































III.1   Consistency with previous results 
Replicating previous studies, we find behavior that is significantly different than that 
predicted by equilibrium analysis. Allocations to the public good in the VCM are significantly 
different than zero, starting at around 40% of endowment and then declining over the length 
of the game. Allocations in the WLM are also not at equilibrium; in only 2 out of the 60 
periods (10 periods for each group times six groups), the individuals in the groups allocated 
the same amounts to the public good. Allocations in the BSM also deviate from equilibrium.  
In only 9 out of 120 periods does one player contribute his entire endowment while the others 
contribute zero. 
We also observe contributions decreasing over the game, consistent with previous 
experiments.  A GLS regression of contributions on period number and including an indicator 
variable for each subject and each group produces a significantly negative coefficient on   8




III.2   Public Good Production and Efficiency 
Figure 2 shows the amount of public good produced in each of the three environments. 
The total possible is 100 in each of the three games.  































The amount of public good produced is much higher in the BSM than in the other two 
mechanisms, with the VCM yielding a middle level and the WSM the lowest level.  
However, more public good does not necessarily imply more efficiency in the WLM 
or the BSM (although it does in the VCM).  For example a contribution distribution like {50, 
50, 50, 50} will generate 100 units of public good in the BSM, yet is quite inefficient 
compared with the equilibrium contribution of {50, 0, 0, 0}. Figure 3 graphs the efficiency 
levels observed in the three games by comparing the earnings of each group with the total 
possible earnings they could have had in the most efficient outcome (not necessarily an 
equilibrium outcome).   
                                                 
5Complete regressions data available upon request.   9






















We find the highest efficiency levels in the BSM, with the VCM again in the middle 
and the WLM at the bottom. 
 
III.3   Conditional cooperation  
But the focus of our paper is on identifying the decision rules in these environments.  
A number of competing models have been proposed to explain deviations both from 
equilibrium and from efficiency, like those found above.  One set of those models involve 
reciprocity (also called matching, also called conditional cooperation).
6  In these models, 
participants react to the allocations of their counterparts (either previous or current).  Thus if 
others contribute to the public good you want to contribute, while if others free-ride you want 
to keep your endowment for your private consumption.   
                                                 
6See, e.g., Sugden (1984), Rabin (1993), Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), 
Segal and Sobel (2006) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006), along with Sobel´s (2005) review.   10
We follow Croson (1998) in analyzing allocations to test this explanation.  We begin 
with running one regression for each game.  The dependent measure is individual i’s 
contribution to the public good in period t.  Independent variables include indicator variables 
for the period t, for each individual, for each group and, of most interest, a measure of what 
the individual’s counterparts did last period 
In each of the three games, we compare the significance of all three lagged individual 
decisions: LagMax, LagMed and LagMin. LagMax indicates the maximum contribution to the 
public good observed by a subject in the previous period, not including their own, LagMed 
the intermediate contribution and LagMin the minimum. As the group size is four, there are 
only three relevant decisions (the contribution of the subject himself is excluded). 
Note that in the different games, each of the contributions has a different meaning 
from the efficiency point of view.  For example, in the WLM, the LagMin contribution 
determined the amount of public good provided in the previous period, while it had no impact 
on earnings in the BSM and only contributes to earnings in the VCM.  This observation forms 
the basis of our hypothesis that participants will respond to LagMin in the WLM, and 
LagMax in the BSM. 
The regressions are run using random effects regression
7 and the equation is:  
igt it cont ε α γ τ β β β β + + + + + + + = ∑ ∑ ∑
− = = =












1 3 1 2 1 1 0  
where  contit  is  i´s contribution in period t, LagMax-it-1 denotes the lagged maximum 
contribution of i‘s partners in the previous period, LagMed-it-1 denotes the lagged intermediate 
contribution of i‘s partners in the previous period and LagMin-it-1 denotes the lagged minimum 
contribution of i’s partners.  We include an indicator variable for each period except the first, 
an indicator variable for each group G except the first, and an indicator variable for each 
individual, excluding one per group to avoid colinearity.  The error term is estimated with 
random effects for period, group and individual.  
In addition, we run a parallel regression for each game using standardized regression 
(standardizing the independent variables of interest).  This allows us to compare the size of 
the resulting coefficients directly, in addition to comparing their statistical significance.  The 
results are presented for each game separately, in Table 1 to 3. 
 
                                                 
7This approach has been used, for instance, in Croson (1998). For further reading see Greene (2000).    11
Table 1:  Conditional Cooperation in the VCM 
 Estimate   
(SE) 










.0586      
LagMin 0.23 
(0.12) 
.0652      
LagMax 0.05 
(0.09) 
.5865      
LagMedSTD       2.71 
(1.42) 
.0586 
LagMinSTD       2.05 
(1.11) 
.0652 





Yes     Yes   
Subject 
 
Yes     Yes   
Group 
 
Yes     Yes   
N 216      216   
R
2 Adjusted  0.6071      0.6071   
 
 
Table 2:  Conditional Cooperation in the WLM 
 Estimate   
(SE) 










.8639      
LagMin 0.65 
(0.15) 
<.0001      
LagMax 0.01 
(0.07) 
.8610      
LagMedSTD       0.15 
(0.90) 
.8639 
LagMinSTD       3.66 
(0.87) 
<.0001 





Yes     Yes   
Subject 
 
Yes     Yes   
Group 
 
Yes     Yes   
N 216      216   
R
2 Adjusted  0.4595      0.4595   
   12
Table 3:  Conditional Cooperation in the BSM 
 Estimate   
(SE) 










.1873      
LagMin 0.16 
(0.09) 
.0807      
LagMax -0.11 
(0.06) 
.0548      
LagMedSTD       -1.53 
(1.16) 
.1873 
LagMinSTD       1.61 
(0.92) 
.0807 





Yes     Yes   
Subject 
 
Yes     Yes   
Group 
 
Yes     Yes   
N 432      432   
R
2 Adjusted  0.4343      0.4343   
 
Croson (1998) and Croson et al. (2005) showed that the average or median 
contribution is salient to the participants in a VCM game, and positively related to their own 
allocations.  As can be seen in Table 1, the lagged median contribution is the closest to 
statistical significance in the VCM (p=.0586), with the lagged minimum contribution also 
being marginally significant (p=.0652).  In the standardized regression, the coefficient on the 
lagged median is larger than that on the lagged minimum (2.71 versus 2.06), suggesting that 
individuals react more to the lagged median than the other three measures, consistent with 
previous research.   
In the WLM (Table 2), as predicted only the lagged minimum contribution is 
statistically significant (p<.0001); the coefficients on the other two variables of interest are 
both nonsignificant.  Similarly, in the standardized regression, the coefficient on lagged 
minimum is much larger than the other two (3.66 versus 0.15 and 0.13), confirming our 
hypothesis that in the WLM individuals move their contributions in response to the minimum 
contribution of the rest of the group, rather than the median or maximum. 
Finally, Table 3 examines the BSM.  Here, the lagged maximum contribution comes 
closest to statistical significance (p=.054).  Interestingly, the coefficient on this parameter is 
negative, suggesting that as the lagged maximum contribution of others increases, one´s own   13
contribution decreases.  While this is not the typical conditional cooperation pattern, it is 
entirely consistent with the payoffs and resulting efficiency properties of the BSM.   
Remember that in this game any contributions other than the maximum are lost, and thus 
represent a decrease in total social efficiency.  Thus if someone else is contributing more, 
there is no benefit either to oneself or to the group of contributing more.  Thus the negative 
relationship between the lagged maximum contribution and one´s own contribution makes 
perfect sense.  Similarly in the standardized regression, the coefficient on the lagged 
maximum variable (-2.06) is larger (in absolute terms) than the other coefficients (1.61, -
1.53).  This again reinforces our hypothesis that it is the most powerful factor impacting 
current contributions in this game. 
The previous analysis looked within each game, but what about comparisons between 
the three games?  Table 4 provides exactly this.  For this analysis, we again use the individual 
contribution as the dependent variable, and include indicator variables for period number (2-
10), subject, and group.  Since we are using data from all three games, we also include 
indicator variables for the game type.  Our main independent variables of interest are the 
lagged median (LagMed) interacted with a dummy for the VCM game (VCM), the lagged 
minimum (LagMin) interacted with a dummy for the WLM game and the lagged maximum 
(LagMax), interacted with a dummy for the BSM game.  If these interactions are significant, 
this tells us that the effect of these lagged variables is different in the different games as 
indicated above.  The regression equation is thus: 
igt
it cont
ε α γ κ τ
β β β β
+ + + + +
∗ + ∗ + ∗ + =
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
− = = = =
− − − − − −
i g T t












) ( 4 ,
10
2
1 3 1 2 1 1 0
 
As above, we present a second regression using standardized measures, so that 
coefficients can be directly compared.  Results are presented in Table 4. 
The interaction variables are all significant or marginally significant.  As predicted, 
players respond (marginally) more to the lagged median in the VCM than in the other two 
games (p=.0952), significantly more to the lagged minimum in the WLM than in the other 
two games (p=.0032) and significant more (negatively) to the lagged maximum in the BSM 
than in the other two games (p=.0006).  From the standardized regression, consistent with 
these results, the effects are the largest for the BSM (-2.16), next for the WLM (1.51) and 
smallest for the VCM (0.98).   
Thus the results from our experiment broadly support our hypotheses.  We replicate 
the finding that individuals are conditional cooperative in these settings with strategic   14
interactions.  However, looking within the three games we find different types of conditional 
cooperation. Participants´ contributions are responsive to the median contribution of others in 
the VCM, as has been previously found.  But contributions are responsive to the minimum 
contribution of others in the WLM, and (negatively) to the maximum contribution in the BSM.  
Furthermore, conditionally cooperative behavior is significantly different in the three games, 
with the focal contribution (median in VCM, minimum in WLM and maximum in BSM) 
having more explanatory power in its companion game than in the other two. 
Table 4:  Conditional Cooperation Comparing the Games 
 Estimate   
(SE) 










.0952      
LagMin*WLM 0.16 
(0.06) 
.0032      
LagMax*BSM -0.12 
(0.04) 
.0006      
LagMedSTD*VCM       0.98 
(0.58) 
.0952 
LagMinSTD*WLM       1.51 
(0.51) 
.0032 





Yes     Yes   
Subject 
 
Yes     Yes   
Group 
 
Yes     Yes   
Treatment 
 
Yes     Yes   
N 864      864   
R




IV.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper examines not just the existence but also the form of conditionally 
cooperative  behavior in three different public goods games, the standard voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM) or linear public goods game, where it has been previously 
studied, and two public goods games where conditional cooperation had not been previously 
documented: the weakest link mechanism (WLM) and the best shot mechanism (BSM).  We   15
hypothesize and show that individuals exhibit conditional cooperation in all three settings, but 
that it takes a different form in each. 
In the VCM we replicate previous results, showing that individuals react to the median 
(or average) contribution of others.  In the WLM, we show that individuals react to the 
minimum contribution of others, which makes sense since it is this minimum that determines 
the amount of public good produced and resulting efficiency.  Finally, in the BSM we show 
that individuals react negatively to the maximum contribution of others.  Again, this makes 
sense, since as one participant increases their contribution, increased contributions from other 
group members are simply wasted, and thus both efficiency and self-interest are enhanced 
when those contributions decrease.  In addition to showing the existence of this focal 
contribution within each game, we present an analysis comparing the three games.  We find 
that individual contributions vary (marginally) more with the median contribution in the VCM 
than in the other two games, significantly more with the minimum contribution in the WLM 
than in the other two games, and significantly more (negatively) with the maximum 
contribution in the BSM than in the other two games.  
We believe that this paper makes a number of contributions.  First, it presents the first 
experiment on the simultaneous BSM, which had been proposed by Hirschleifer (1983) but 
has not previously been experimentally explored in a repeated setting with four players 
(previous work focuses only the two-person sequential version of the game).  As with other 
public goods games, we find deviations from the equilibrium predictions in this game.  More 
detail on the experimental results from this game can be found in Appendix I. But our most 
important contribution is to examine conditional cooperation in these three games. 
Previous work on conditional cooperation focuses almost exclusively on the VCM, 
both in the laboratory and in the field.  Like that work, we find the existence of conditional 
cooperation, and that in linear public goods settings individuals are most responsive to the 
median contribution of others.  We extend this stream of research to examine conditional 
cooperation in the WLM and the BSM as well.   
In the WLM, we find individuals act consistently with conditional cooperation, but 
that they are reciprocal not with the average contribution of others but with the minimum 
contribution of others.  In the BSM, we find individuals´ contributions are negatively related 
to the maximum contribution of others.  This is consistent with conditional cooperation as 
when others give more, one´s own contributions are wasted, both personally and socially.  
Thus both self-interest and conditionally cooperative preferences drive the negative 
relationship.     16
Our demonstration of asymmetric conditional cooperation in different games has 
important implications for explaining and predicting behavior in these settings.  For example, 
while conditional cooperation can drive behavior away from equilibrium in the VCM (toward 
positive contributions), it can drive behavior toward equilibrium in the WLM (toward 
symmetric contributions) as individuals match the minimum contributions of others.  Thus the 
previously-maintained assumption that conditional cooperation explains deviations from 
equilibrium may be true only in certain settings.  In some settings (like the WLM, for 
example), conditional cooperation may explain convergence toward equilibrium. 
Indeed, if we examine behavior in the WLM, we see some evidence of convergence.  
Remember that equilibrium behavior in this game means that all participants in a group give 
the same amount.  Thus we can use the within-group standard deviation of contributions as a 
measure of convergence to an equilibrium: at equilibrium this measure should be zero.  We 
calculate this measure for each group, for each period, and then compare the averages.  We 
find that the average within-group standard deviation of contributions in period 1 is 13.02, 
while the average within-group standard deviation of contributions in period 10 has 
significantly reduced to 3.94 (a paired t-test comparing the six independent observations [one 
for each group] shows this difference to be significant, p=.0069).  Thus, over time conditional 
cooperation pushes behavior in the WLM closer to the equilibrium prediction of symmetric 
contribution. 
In terms of mechanism design (for example, in the voluntary funding of public goods), 
one might evaluate mechanisms not just on their equilibrium predictions, but also the impact 
that conditional cooperation is likely to have on the behavior of the constituents.  From a more 
psychological perspective, it is also interesting to see both how sensitive participants in these 
games are to the behavior of others, and the different ways that sensitivity is actualized.  
Participants focus not just on any social information, but on the relevant social information 
for their decision (e.g. the minimum in the WLM) and their reactions to that information is 
again driven by the payoffs of the situation (e.g. negatively in the BSM). 
Finally, our evidence suggests some directions for further development of theories of 
conditional cooperation.  Previous work has limited attention to settings, like the VCM, where 
efficiency is monotonically increasing in cooperation.  We believe that in order to have a truly 
significant impact, the scope of these theories needs to be extended to other situations, and 
their assumptions and implications worked out for the more general case.  We hope that 
evidence like that presented here will provide some guidance in that direction.   17
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Appendix 1 
 
Since the simultaneous, four-player BSM has not previously been experimentally 
explored, in this appendix we present some additional detail of behaviour in this game.   
Figure 1 in the main paper shows the aggregate average contribution in each of the three 
treatments.  Figure 1A here presents average contributions toward the public good for each 
group in the BSM. 
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As can be seen here and in aggregate in Figure 1, contributions begin high and then 
decline over the course of the game.  Remember, however, that the amount of public good 
provided is not sensitive to the average contribution, instead it is sensitive to the maximum 
contribution made by any one individual.   
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Again, following Figure 2 in the main paper, Figure 2A here shows the amount of 
public good provided in the BSM disaggregated by each of the 12 groups. 
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Here the picture indicates a coordination difficulty.   At the start of the game, at least 
one individual in each group is prepared to volunteer to contribute maximally or close to it.  
However, after four rounds or so of this type of contribution, this contributor tries to “hand 
off” the responsibility to another group member. However, without communication, it is 
difficult to ensure that another group member will be prepared to pick up the burden, thus 
causing coordination failure in the second half of the game. 
Finally, in Figure 3 we examine efficiency.  It is possible, for example, that these high 
levels of public good production in the first four rounds of the game are due to multiple 
individuals inefficiently contributing to the public good.  Figure 3A shows efficiency 
percentages (defined as the total earnings of the group divided by the maximum possible 
earnings) for each group in the BSM.   23
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As can be seen, in early rounds some efficiency is lost due to excess (wasted) 
contribution.  However, the losses in later rounds due to a lack of public good provision far 
overshadows these initial losses.  This result is, of course, sensitive to the parameters we 
chose.  In this particular case, the social cost of wasted contributions is one-half the 
opportunity cost of having the public good not being provided.  Thus the efficiency losses 
from overcontribution in early rounds are small compared with the efficiency losses from lack 
of contribution in later rounds. 
Do groups learn to play the equilibrium in this game?  Using a strict interpretation of 
equilibrium, the answer must be no.  As we have seen in the text, in only 9 rounds out of 120 
do groups coordinate on the equilibrium of {0, 0, 0, 50}.  However, a looser definition may be 
in order.  For example, consider a contribution profile {0, 0, 0, X}.  While not strictly 
speaking an equilibrium this profile captures only a single player´s deviation from it (giving X 
instead of giving 50), and thus signals at least some understanding of the game.   
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  Table 1A categorizes the group´s contributions based on the number of individuals 
contributing zero.   
Table 1A:  Number of Individuals in Group Contributing Zero 
 
Period 1  
(out of 12) 
Period 10  
(out of 12) 
Whole Game 
(out of 120) 
4  0 0 5 
3 0  6  27 
2 4  4  46 
1 4  2  26 
0 4  0  16 
 
In equilibrium and close to it, we expect to see exactly three individuals contributing 
zero in each period.  In period 1 this occurs in none of the 12 groups.  However, by the end of 
the game (Period 10) half of the groups (6 out of 12) have arrived at an allocation involving 
three zero contributions.  A t-test of proportions confirms that these ratios are significantly 
different from each other (t=11, p<.0001).  Over the game as a whole, 22.5% of the 
observations fall into this category. 
Finally, for the interested reader, Table 2A presents the full dataset.  We have 
highlighted the 9 observations at the equilibrium (bold) and the further observations involving 
close-to-equilibrium behaviour of {0, 0, 0, X} mentioned above (italics).  Additionally, we 
have identified a second close-to-equilibrium outcome, of {0, 0, X, 50} (underlined).  Like the 
above, this contribution profile represents only a one-player deviation from equilibrium (here, 
the player giving X when they should be giving 0).  We believe that this deviation may serve 
as a kind of insurance against the full-contributing subject deciding it is time for someone else 
to have a turn at giving.  This behaviour is also relatively common, observed 28 out of 120 
trials in our game.  Thus we have 9+18+28=55 out of 120 (46%) of observations either at 
equilibrium or only one deviation away. 
In sum, we find that the BSM results in high contributions and relatively high 
efficiency, especially compared with the VCM and WLM games in the text. However, 
participants´ play is quite far from the equilibrium, and even once a group reaches the 
equilibrium they are unlikely to stick there.   
These results can be compared with results examining the BSM in sequential settings 
(Harrison and Hirschleifer 1989, Prasnikar and Roth 1992, Duffy and Feltovich 1999, 
Andreoni et al. 2002, Carpenter 2002), where coordination is significantly easier.  We find   25
that in our setting, when the strategy space and the number of players are large and when the 
game is played simultaneously without signals for coordination, behaviour is quite far from 
the equilibrium.  However, this mechanism still results in remarkably efficient outcomes, 
relative to the VCM and the WLM. 
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Table 2A: Individual Contributions, Best Shot Mechanism 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 01 02 03 04 11 12 13 14 21 22 23 24 
0 0 0 0  0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 5  5 0  0  0 0 0 5  0 0   0  5  5  0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
5 0 5 0  5 0 0 0 5 5  5  5  5 5 0  5  0  0 5  0 0 5   0 0 0 0 5 0  0  0  0 
5 0 0 0  0  0 0 0 2 5  0  0 5 5  2 0   2  0  0 5   0 0  0 0 0  0 
0 0 7 0  5 0  0 0 5 0 5  0  5 0  0 5 1  0 0  0 0  0 0  0  0   0 
0 0 3 7  0  0 0 5 0  5  5  5 5  5  5  0 0  5  0   0 
3 0 5 0  5  5 5 0 5 5 5 0   5 5 0 0 0  5 0  5 0 5  0  8 
0 0 0  0 5 0  0 5  5 0  0  0  5  0  0  5 0  0 6 0  0 0 0 0 
5  5 0 0  0  0 0  0 0  5  0  0  0 5 0  0  0  5 0  0 3  5 0 
0 0  0  0  0  0  0 0   0  5 0   0  0 0   0  0 5 0  0 0 0 
0 0 0  0  5 0  5  0 0  5  0  0  5  5  5  5 0   0  0 5  
 
Bold:  Equilibrium (9/120) 
Italics:  Three contributions of zero, one contribution less than 50 (18/120) 
Underline:  Two contributions of zero, one contribution of 50 (28/120) 
 